Naturalism

Naturalism is a philosophical position which holds that all that exists is natural - in other words, is part of the spatio - temporal processes of nature - or, that if any sort of nonnatural object may exist, it is known only through its effects within nature. Everything that can be experienced is within the spatio - temporal order of nature.

As a system of natural processes, nature possesses a degree of orderliness that makes it intelligible, but it cannot be explained as a whole. Nor can it as a whole express moral value. Moral values, however, may emerge in the relation between human beings as one part of nature and the rest of nature. As part of nature, humans are subject to lawful natural processes; intelligence emerges from the active life of organisms within nature.

Differing views are held within naturalism regarding the general character of nature. Reductionistic naturalism, which predominated during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, holds that all natural objects are reducible to objects as characterized by physical science. Nature is a determined system and human beings, as part of nature, are determined. Values are not real.

Contemporary naturalism, however, holds that all experienced objects and qualities are equally real within nature. The categories of science do not exhaust nature's reality. Richness, diversity, spontaneity, and value dimensions exist within nature that elude the categories of the physical scientist but that are immediately experienced in human interaction with nature. As part of nature, human beings manifest spontaneity and freedom. Scientific method, as the method of natural inquiry, is a way of dealing with any content that reveals itself within nature.

Sandra B Rosenthal

Bibliography
N Carver and P Hare, eds., Naturalism and Rationality (1986); S M Eames, Pragmatic Naturalism (1976); L R Furst and P Skrine, Naturalism (1971); F A Lange, The History of Naturalism, (1925); V C Punzo, Reflective Naturalism (1969); A J Reck, The New American Philosophers (1968); R W Sellars, Neglected Alternatives (1973).

Naturalism

The view that the "natural" universe, the universe of matter and energy, is all that there really is. This rules out God, so naturalism is atheistic. It rules out other spiritual beings as well as God, so naturalism is materialistic. By ruling out a spiritual part of the human person which might survive death and a God who might resurrect the body, naturalism also rules out survival after death. In addition, naturalism usually but not always denies human freedom on the grounds that every event must be explainable by deterministic natural laws. It usually but not always denies any absolute values because it can find no grounds for such values in a world made up only of matter and energy. And finally, naturalism usually but not always denies that the universe has any meaning or purpose because there is no God to give it a meaning or purpose, and nothing else which can give it a meaning or purpose.

Anyone who accepts the first three denials, of God, spiritual beings, and immortality, might be called a naturalist in the broad sense, and anyone who adds to these the denial of freedom, values, and purpose might be labeled a naturalist in the strict sense, or a strict naturalist. Communists, for instance, are not strict naturalists, for their world view includes a purpose in history, at least in human history, and perhaps in the whole history of the universe. Some religious humanists are not strict naturalists, for they argue for free will and even for values which are independent of known wants and needs. Some opponents of naturalism would argue that naturalists in the broad sense are at least somewhat inconsistent and that naturalism in the broad sense leads logically to strict naturalism. Many strict naturalists would agree with this.

Those who reject naturalism in both the strict and broad sense do so for a variety of reasons. They may have positive arguments for the existence of some of what naturalists deny, or they may have what seem to be decisive refutations of some or all of the arguments for naturalism. But, in addition to particular arguments against naturalist tenets or their grounds of belief, some opponents of naturalism believe that there is a general argument which holds against any form of naturalism. These opponents hold that naturalism has a "fatal flaw" or, to put it more strongly, that naturalism is self - destroying. If naturalism is true, then human reason must be the result of natural forces.

These natural forces, are not, on the naturalistic view, rational themselves, nor can they be the result of a rational cause. So human reason would be the result of nonrational causes. This, it can be argued, gives us a strong reason to distrust human reason, especially in its less practical and more theoretical exercises. But the theory of naturalism is itself such an exercise of theoretical reason. If naturalism is true, we would have strong reasons to distrust theoretical reasoning. If we distrust theoretical reasoning, we distrust particular applications of it, such as the theory of naturalism. Thus, if naturalism is true, we have strong reasons to distrust naturalism.

M H MacDonald

Bibliography
C S Lewis, Miracles; A Flew, God and Philosophy and A Rational Animal; J N Jordan, Determinism's Dilemma; J R Lucas, The Freedom of the Will; R Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.